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ANOTHER LOOK AT THE L’AMBIANCE PLAZA COLLAPSE  
By Rachel Martin1 and Norbert J. Delatte,2 Member, ASCE 
ABSTRACT: The collapse of the L’Ambiance Plaza building, under construction in Bridgeport, Conn., in 1987, 
killed 28 construction workers. A number of concurrent investigations were undertaken to attempt to determine 
the cause. At least six separate theories were developed. However, a prompt legal settlement kept these inves-
tigations from being completed. This paper reviews the collapse and discusses the competing theories. The 
failure focused controversy on the safety of the lift-slab construction method. Because there is a need in civil 
engineering education for case studies to illustrate ethical and professional issues as well as technical principles, 
this paper also addresses these aspects. Ways for civil engineering educators to use this case study to address 
these issues also are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The death of 28 workers in the construction collapse of the 
L’Ambiance Plaza building in Bridgeport, Conn., triggered a 
massive rescue effort and several investigations. Both the legal 
and engineering professions are interested in causes of failures. 
The legal profession seeks to assign responsibility, and the 
engineering profession seeks to learn from failures in order to 
eliminate poor designs and unsafe practices. Sometimes, as in 
the case of the investigation of the L’Ambiance Plaza collapse, 
the two objectives are in conﬂict. 
For the engineer and engineering student, knowledge of en-
gineering failures is just as important as knowledge of its suc-
cesses. A success illustrates what engineering can make pos-
sible, whereas a failure demonstrates its limits. It takes 
numerous successful structures to ensure the quality of a de-
sign or a construction method. One failure, however, can dis-
credit an entire design or building technique. Because of this, 
the information that each failure has to offer should be care-
fully studied and applied to all future designs. As a result sim-
ilar failures, as well as their tragic consequences, can be 
avoided. 
Because of their importance, failures should be incorporated 
into engineering education. Unfortunately, undergraduate en-
gineering students receive little exposure to engineering fail-
ures in college. This approach to engineering education not 
only leaves students less prepared for what they will face after 
graduation, but it also fails to show the importance of contin-
uing education (Delatte 1997). This may be one of the reasons 
that a 1983 survey of ASCE section and branch presidents 
found that engineering failures are all too common (Bosela 
1993). 
Because undergraduate engineering students already face an 
overcrowded curriculum, rather than requiring a new class 
covering failure case studies, these case studies can be incor-
porated into existing classes throughout a student’s college ca-
reer. Not only will this approach capture the students’ interest 
by showing how their classes relate to engineering, but it also 
will inspire them to learn more about the history of the pro-
fession. In addition, it teaches them the importance of contin-
ued learning throughout one’s professional career. Finally, fail-
ure case studies provide a perfect opportunity to discuss ethical 
concerns in real life situations as well as serve as a reminder 
the slab. 
of the repercussions of careless engineering (Delatte 1997). 
This is a topic that is often neglected in engineering education. 
According to a 1987 survey conducted by the Committee 
of Education of the Committee on Forensic Engineering of 
ASCE, 63.2% of schools indicated that they would consider 
teaching a course on failure case studies if the appropriate 
materials were available. This clearly demonstrates the need 
for case study material and teaching aids to encourage the 
incorporation of failure case studies into the engineering cur-
riculum (Rendon-Herrero 1993). The objectives of this paper 
are to 
• Summarize what is known about the design, construction, 
and collapse of L’Ambiance Plaza 
• Examine the	 causes of the failure as well as the legal 
ramiﬁcations 
• Explore the technical, procedural, and ethical concerns 
present, focusing on how the failure could have been 
avoided and how to prevent similar failures in the future 
This failure case study can be integrated into engineering 
classes to introduce new topics or as the topic of a short re-
search paper. 
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 
L’Ambiance Plaza was planned to be a 16-story building 
with 13 apartment levels topping three parking levels. It con-
sisted of two offset rectangular towers, 19.2 X 34.1 m (63 X 
112 ft) each, connected by an elevator (Fig. 1). Posttensioned 
concrete slabs 178-mm (7-in.) thick and steel columns com-
prised its structural frame (Cuoco et al. 1992). Posttensioning 
overcomes the tensile weakness of concrete slabs by placing 
high strength steel wires along their length or width before the 
concrete is poured. After the concrete hardens, hydraulic jacks 
pull and anchor the wires compressing the concrete (Levy and 
Salvadori 1992). 
The lift-slab method of construction, patented by Youtz and 
Slick in 1948, was utilized in the construction of this building. 
Following this technique, the ﬂoors slabs for all 16 levels were 
constructed on the ground, one on top of the other, with bond 
breakers between them. Then packages of two or three slabs 
were lifted into temporary position by a hydraulic lifting ap-
paratus and held in place by steel wedges. The lifting appa-
ratus consisted of a hydraulic jack on top of each column, with 
a pair of lifting rods extending down to lifting collars cast in 
Once the slabs were positioned correctly, they were per-
manently attached to the steel columns. Two shear walls in 
each tower were to provide the lateral resistance for the com-
pleted building on all but the top two ﬂoors. These two ﬂoors 
depended on the rigid joints between the steel columns and 
the concrete slabs for their stability. Because the shear wall 
FIG. 1. Floor Plan of L’Ambiance Plaza 
FIG. 2. Ruins of L’Ambiance Plaza (Image from Internet at (http://www.sgh.com/aplaza.htm)) 
played such an indispensable role in the lateral stability of the 
building, the structural drawings speciﬁed that during con-
struction the shear walls should be within three ﬂoors of the 
lifted slabs (Heger 1991). 
COLLAPSE 
At the time of collapse, the building was a little more than 
halfway completed (Fig. 2). In the west tower, the 9th, 10th, 
and 11th ﬂoor slab package was parked in Stage IV directly 
under the 12th ﬂoor and roof package (Fig. 3). The shear walls 
were about ﬁve levels below the lifted slabs (Cuoco et al. 
1992). 
The workmen were tack welding wedges under the 9th, 
10th, and 11th ﬂoor package to temporarily hold them into 
position when a loud metallic sound followed by rumbling was 
heard. Kenneth Shepard, an ironworker who was installing 
wedges at the time, looked up to see the slab over him ‘‘crack-
ing like ice breaking.’’ Suddenly, the slab fell onto the slab 
below it, which was unable to support this added weight and 
in turn fell. The entire structure collapsed, ﬁrst the west tower 
and then the east tower, in 5 s, only 2.5 s longer than it would 
FIG. 3. Status of Construction at Time of Collapse [Based on 
Information from Cuoco (1992)] 
have taken an object to free fall from that height. Ten days of 
frantic rescue operations revealed that 28 construction workers 
died in the collapse, making it the worst lift-slab construction 
accident. Kenneth Shepard was the only one on his crew to 
survive (Levy and Salvadori 1992). 
CAUSES OF FAILURE 
An unusually prompt legal settlement prematurely ended all 
investigations of the collapse. Consequently, the exact cause 
of the collapse has never been established. The building had 
a number of deﬁciencies—any one of which could have trig-
gered the collapse. The question, however, remains which one 
of these problems was in fact the triggering mechanism lead-
ing to the total collapse. There are six competing theories as 
to the trigger. Kaminetzky lists, but does not discuss, a seventh 
theory—‘‘failure resulting from lateral soil pressure acting on 
the foundation walls’’ (Kaminetzky 1991, p. 82). 
• Theory 1: National Bureau of Standards (NBS), now the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithers-
burg, Md.—An overloaded steel angle welded to a shear-
head arm channel deformed, causing the jack rod and lift-
ing nut to slip out and the collapse to begin (Korman 
1987). 
• Theory 2: Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers—The instabil-
ity of the wedges holding the 12th ﬂoor and roof package 
caused the collapse (Cuoco et al. 1992). 
• Theory 3: Schupack Suarez Engineers, Inc.—The im-
proper design of the posttensioning tendons caused the 
collapse (Poston et al. 1991). 
• Theory 4: Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), Washington, D.C.—Questionable weld details 
and substandard welds caused the collapse (McGuire 
1992). 
• Theory 5: Failure Analysis Associates, Inc. (FaAA)— 
The sensitivity of L’Ambiance Plaza to lateral displace-
ment caused its collapse through global instability (Mon-
carz et al. 1993). 
• Theory 6: Oswald Rendon-Herrero—Rapid slump of a 
column footing precipitated the collapse (Rendon-Herrero 
1994). 
Theory 1—Overloaded Steel Angle 
The NBS investigation concluded that the failure occurred 
at the building’s most heavily loaded column, E4.8, or the 
adjacent column, E3.8, as a result of a lifting assembly failure 
(Fig. 4). The shearhead reinforces the concrete slab at each 
column, transfers vertical loads from the slabs to the columns, 
and provides a place of attachment for the lifting assembly. It 
consists of steel channels cast in the concrete slab, leaving a 
space for the lifting angle. The lifting angle has holes to pass 
the lifting rods through. These rods are raised by the hydraulic 
jacks on the columns above them (Levy and Salvadori 1992). 
Shortly before the collapse, the workers lifted the 9th, 10th, 
and 11th ﬂoor package to its ﬁnal position and began tack 
welding the steel wedges into place. They used a jack on top 
of the column, E4.8 or E3.8, to slightly adjust the position of 
the slab overloading the lifting angles. When the shearheads 
and lifting angles had lifted the package of three 3.13-MN 
(320-ton) slabs, they were dangerously close to their maximum 
capacity, so adding even the smallest of loads could strain 
them. 
One of the reasons was that the lifting capacities of the two 
types of jacks used were too small for the 9.38-MN (960-ton) 
package being lifted. The regular jacks have a maximum load 
of 869 kN (89 tons), and the superjacks have a maximum load 
of 1.47 MN (150 tons). The NBS also tested the shearhead 
and lifting angle and found that they tended to twist as the 
loads approached 781 kN (80 tons) because, although strong 
enough, they were not stiff enough. The excess force deformed 
the lifting angle, allowing the jack rod and lifting nut to slip 
out of the lifting angle and hit the column with 333 kN (75,000 
lb) of force. This accounts for the loud noise that Kenneth 
FIG. 4. Lifting Assembly 
Shepard heard and the indentation found in that column. After 
this initial slip, the jack rods and lifting nuts in the entire E 
line progressively slipped, causing the ninth ﬂoor slab to col-
lapse, which initiated the collapse of the entire building (Kor-
man 1987). This theory was later abandoned by NBS in favor 
of Theory 4 (Culver and Marshall 1994). 
Theory 2—Unstable Wedges 
Thornton-Tomasetti Engineers concluded that the instability 
of the wedges at Column 3E caused the 12th ﬂoor and roof 
package to fall, which initiated the collapse. They disagreed 
with the NBS investigation, ﬁnding that all the wedges sup-
porting the 9th, 10th, and 11th ﬂoor package were mounted 
prior to the collapse and that the column had no indentations 
on it. They, however, did ﬁnd abnormal tack welds on the 
wedges that supported the 12th ﬂoor and roof package, a large 
deformation on the top edge of the west wedge of this set, and 
indentations on the underside of the Level 9 shearhead. The 
shallowness of the indentations indicated that, although both 
lifting nuts slipped out, they were not heavily loaded at the 
time. 
Their investigation also found that the shearhead gaps on 
Columns 3E and 3.8E [16 mm (0.628 in.)] were much larger 
than the gaps on the rest of the building [5.92–8.31 mm 
(0.233–0.327 in.)] and other buildings built with the lift-slab 
technique [6.35–9.53 mm (0.250–0.375 in.)]. In addition to 
these abnormally large gaps, the shearheads used on these two 
columns did not have cutouts in their lifting angles to restrict 
relative shifting and were installed eccentrically. Finally, until 
a wedge is completely welded into place, it depends on friction 
to hold it. Normally, this is sufﬁcient. The large shearhead gaps 
on Columns 3E and 3.8E and the presence of hydraulic fuel 
on these wedges, however, would have demanded an ex-
tremely high friction coefﬁcient to hold the wedges in place. 
On the day of collapse, the lateral load from the hydraulic 
jack exerted on the heavily loaded wedges caused the west 
wedge to roll. Then the local adjustments to slab elevations 
caused the remaining wedge to roll out, which initiated the 
collapse of the 11th ﬂoor and roof package and the west tower 
(Fig. 5). Forces transmitted through the pour strips or the hor-
izontal jack, or the impact of the debris from the west tower 
triggered the east tower’s collapse (Cuoco et al. 1992). 
Theory 3—Improper Design of Posttensioning 
Tendons 
Schupack Suarez Engineers, Inc. analyzed the structural be-
havior of a typical west tower ﬂoor slab, with respect to the 
FIG. 5. Failure Sequence 
FIG. 6. General Layout of Posttensioning Tendons (Each Line Represents 1–5 Monostrand Tendons) 
unusual layout of the posttensioning tendons (Fig. 6). The ten-
dons in the east tower follow a typical two-way banded post-
tensioning tendon layout. In this layout the vertical tendons 
distribute the weight of the slab to the east-west column lines, 
which in turn distribute the weight to the columns. The west 
tower, however, deviates from this pattern. At Column 4.8E 
the tendons split in two, both diverging from the column line. 
In the west tower, the vertical tendons still distribute the slab’s 
weight to the column line. In Line E, however, there are no 
tendons to carry this weight. This setup violates the building 
code of the American Concrete Institute, Detroit. Kaminetzky 
pointed out that the code stipulates ‘‘a minimum of two ten-
dons shall be provided in each direction through the critical 
shear section over columns’’ (Kaminetzky 1991, p. 84). 
Furthermore, the design details of the posttensioned ﬂoor 
slabs do not show the location of the shear walls or the open-
ings for the walls at Columns 11A, 8A, and 2H. The design 
did not take these openings into account. Detailed ﬁnite-ele-
ment analysis showed that tensile stresses along Column Line 
E, east of Column 4.8E, exceeded the cracking strength of the 
concrete. Therefore once a crack began, it would immediately 
spread to Column 4.8E. In addition, under ideal lifting con-
ditions, the analysis demonstrated that column 2H would have 
unsuitably high compressive and punching shear stresses (Pos-
ton et al. 1991). 
Theory 4—Poor Weld Details and Welds 
OSHA found that the header bar-to-channel welds on one 
side of the ninth-ﬂoor shearhead, at Column E3.8, had failed 
(Fig. 7). The use of one-sided square-groove welds for the 
header bar-to-channel connection was criticized because they 
were not prequaliﬁed joints, according to the American Weld-
ing Society. Because their penetration was not known, their 
strength could not be determined. OSHA hired Neal S. More-
FIG. 7. Wedged Slab-to-Column Connection 
ton and Associates to examine 30 welds around the shearheads 
at Column E3.8 at the 7th, 8th, and 10th ﬂoors. They found 
only 13 of the 30 welds acceptable; the other 17 were sub-
standard. The questionable weld details and substandard weld-
ing, coupled with drawings that indicated that the welds would 
undoubtedly experience forces that they could not resist, all 
point to weld failure as the trigger of the collapse (McGuire 
1992). 
Theory 5—Global Instability 
FaAA studied the tower’s torsional stability and response to 
lateral loading to understand its collapse. When the concrete 
slabs are temporarily resting on the wedges, the connection is 
rotationally stiff but, as soon as the slab is lifted off one of 
the wedges into its ﬁnal position, it can rotate freely from the 
column. Once the wedges are fully welded into their ﬁnal po-
sitions, the connection becomes rigid again. In the absence of 
lateral loading, the tower is completely stable. 
Lateral loading and displacement, however, can cause the 
slab to lift off one of its wedges, causing the structure to be-
come laterally ﬂexible. FaAA used 3D computer modeling 
(ANSYS) and nonlinear stability modeling to study this phe-
nomenon. Their investigation and analysis led them to the con-
clusion that the tower’s sensitivity to lateral displacement 
caused its collapse. Although FaAA analysts acknowledge that 
another mechanism could have triggered the lateral displace-
ment, they believe that lateral jacking provided sufﬁcient dis-
placement to initiate the collapse (Moncarz et al. 1993). 
Theory 6—Foundation Failure 
In a discussion to Cuoco et al.’s 1992 paper, Rendon-Her-
rero suggested that ‘‘a closer look warrants reconsideration of 
the role played by the foundation in the collapse’’ (Rendon-
Herrero 1994). He noted the the NBS report found disinte-
grated rock and bedrock and ﬁll materials of varying quality. 
The report also questioned whether testing of in-place density 
had been performed and the rationale for the assumption of 
the allowable bearing pressure. He concluded that ‘‘the writer 
feels that descriptions like ‘mica,’ ‘micaceous schist,’ ‘highly 
fractured,’ ‘cracks,’ ‘disintegrated rock,’ ‘ﬁll,’ ‘compaction 
with backhoe,’ ‘highly weathered,’ ‘thinly laminated,’ and 
‘very steep dip (nearly vertical)’ are red ﬂags that indicate the 
need for caution and special attention in the design of a foun-
dation. Punching or local shear is likely when subgrade con-
ditions include loose granular soils (i.e., inadequate compac-
tion); micaceous soils; micaceous schists; and highly fractured, 
steeply dipping bedrock’’ (Rendon-Herrero 1994). 
LEGAL REPERCUSSIONS 
All of these theories are plausible, but what triggered the 
collapse? That may never be known. A two-judge panel me-
diated a universal settlement between 100 parties, which 
closed the L’Ambiance Plaza case. Twenty or more separate 
parties were found guilty of ‘‘widespread negligence, care-
lessness, sloppy practices, and complacency.’’ They all con-
tributed, in varying amounts, to the $41,000,000 settlement 
fund. Those injured and the families of those killed in the 
collapse received $30,000,000. Another $7,600,000 was set 
aside to pay for all of the claims and counterclaims between 
the designers and contractors of L’Ambiance Plaza. 
Although this settlement kept hundreds of cases out of court 
and provided rapid closure to a colossal collapse, it also ended 
all investigations prematurely, leaving the cause of the collapse 
undetermined (Korman 1988). Fortunately, many of the inves-
tigators subsequently published their ﬁndings (Feld and Carper 
1997). 
TECHNICAL ASPECTS 
Although buildings constructed by the lift-slab method are 
stable once they are completed, if great care is not taken during 
construction, they can be dangerous. Feld and Carper (1997) 
reviewed a number of previous lift-slab construction failures 
and near failures. The following measures can be taken to 
ensure lateral stability and safety during construction: 
• During all stages of construction, temporary lateral brac-
ing should be provided, unless the lateral stability of the 
structure is provided through another mechanism. 
• Concrete punching shear and connection redundancies 
should be provided in the structure (Kaminetzky 1991). 
• Sway bracing (cables that keep the stack of ﬂoors from 
shifting sideways) should be used. This was required, but 
not used in L’Ambiance Plaza (Levy and Salvadori 1992). 
Due to the terms of the settlement, many of the technical les-
sons that could have been learned from this incident were lost. 
PROFESSIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
The L’Ambiance Plaza collapse highlighted several proce-
dural deﬁciencies. Responsibility for design was fragmented 
among so many subcontractors that several design deﬁciencies 
went undetected. If the engineer of record had taken respon-
sibility for the overall design of the building or a second en-
gineer had reviewed the design plans, these defects probably 
would have been detected (Heger 1991). Also, standardized 
step-by-step procedures for lift-slab construction should be es-
tablished to ensure the safety of the construction workers. A 
licensed professional engineer should be present during con-
struction to ensure that these guidelines are followed (Kami-
netzky 1991). 
ETHICAL ASPECTS 
Although the L’Ambiance Plaza building was designed to 
be safe once it was completed, during construction it did not 
have an adequate level of stability. This is all too common in 
the construction industry today (Heger 1991). Canon 1 of the 
ASCE Code of Ethics states, ‘‘Engineers shall hold paramount 
the safety, health and welfare of the public and shall strive to 
comply with the principles of sustainable development in the 
performance of their professional duties’’ (ASCE 1998). This 
includes the safety of construction workers. Building regula-
tions do not sufﬁciently consider structural safety during con-
struction and should be changed to require a high standard of 
safety during construction as well as after a building’s com-
pletion. In the absence of such regulations, however, an ethical 
engineer must always consider the safety of workers (Heger 
1991). 
EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS 
Failure plays an important role in engineering practice. 
Through failure analysis, engineers can learn to avoid similar 
technical errors, which allows them to build stronger, safer 
structures. Because failure analysis plays such an integral role 
in a good engineer’s professional career, it only makes sense 
that, in college, engineering students should be taught how to 
analyze engineering failures as well as their importance to any 
engineer’s professional life. In light of an already overcrowded 
undergraduate engineering curriculum, integrating failure case 
studies into already existing engineering classes is the most 
logical solution. 
This approach gives students a better idea of the obstacles 
that will face them after graduation, in addition to demonstrat-
ing how the theoretical ideas taught in their classes are actually 
applied by engineers. The only real obstacle that lies in the 
way of increased failure awareness at an undergraduate level 
is the absence of adequate resources, such as well-developed 
failure case studies and appropriate illustrations. This paper 
provides professors and students with a failure case study that 
can be integrated into undergraduate classes. 
How can educators use these case studies? In structural 
analysis courses, they can be used to address technical topics 
such as safety during construction, load paths, and integrity of 
connections. Students may be assigned to research the litera-
ture in greater depth and support or criticize the available the-
ories. For engineering students, the legal ramiﬁcations of the 
case may be of even greater interest. Two additional important 
points that may be made are the importance of ﬁxing overall 
responsibility on a project before difﬁculties are encountered 
and the need to read the literature of the profession to keep 
up with technical and procedural advances. The ambiguity of 
the outcome of this case can be used to advantage when teach-
ing students in upper division courses, by emphasizing how 
much they still have to learn about the technical challenges of 
the profession. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The L’Ambiance Plaza collapse killed 28 workers and had 
serious ramiﬁcations for all involved with the project as well 
as for the civil engineering profession as a whole. All of the 
theories discussed above are plausible, but it seems unlikely 
that the triggering mechanism of the collapse can ever be de-
termined. There remain, nevertheless, valuable technical, pro-
fessional, procedural, and ethical lessons from this case for 
engineering students and practitioners. 
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